Mais les résultats doivent être attendus longtemps et il n'y a généralement pas de temps metronidazole prix L'autre cas, c'est que l'achat d'un ou d'un autre antibiotique dans une pharmacie classique nécessite des dépenses matérielles considérables et pas toutes les personnes ne peuvent acheter des produits pharmaceutiques aussi coûteux.

Paulo pamplona côrte-real


EDUCATION
1997-2002
Harvard University
Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Licenciatura (B.A.) in Economics, June 1996, Summa Cum Laude.
RESEARCH INTERESTS
Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium Theory.
RESEARCH PAPERS
“Fuzzy Voters, Crisp Votes”
(submitted)
In a binary choice voting scenario, voters may have fuzzy preferences but are required to make crisp choices. In order to compare a crisp
voting procedure with more general mechanisms of fuzzy preference aggregation, we first focus on the latter. We present a formulation of
strategy-proofness in this setting and study its consequences. On one hand, we achieve an axiomatic recommendation of the median as the
aggregation rule for fuzzy preferences. On the other hand, we present conditions under which strategic concerns imply the optimality of a
crisp voting procedure and argue that there is a potential gain in the integration of the preference and choice aggregation programs - namely
that an underlying fuzzy preference structure may also help inform the selection of a choice aggregation rule.
“Poverty-Alleviation Programs” (joint with Márcia Oliveira)
The aim of Poverty-Alleviation Programs (PAP) is fighting poverty and ensuring basic economic needs. However, informational asymmetries
mean that they are subject to moral hazard and adverse selection problems. This suggests the need for adequate instruments to prevent fraud.
This paper provides a multidimensional static model of adverse selection where the government (principal) aims to minimize the costs of a
PAP that ensures that all individuals have access to an exogenously defined minimum income level. Agents may differ in their income-
generating ability and disutility of labor. Under different informational environments we study the effectiveness of workfare (that involves
unpaid and unproductive work in the public sector) as a screening device, based on the comparison with standard monitoring. We find that
when disutility of labor is the only unobservable variable, a workfare policy is inefficient because it ''crowds out'' private sector work and
significantly increases the costs of the program. Under this informational context, monitoring may be the best instrument for preventing fraud.
When income-generating ability is the only unobservable variable, choosing between workfare and monitoring depends not only on the cost
function associated with the latter, but also on income distribution. The analysis of this case suggests that a workfare policy might be
inefficient in the context of undeveloped countries where income distribution exhibits strong inequalities, but appropriate in developed ones.
Finally, a mixed policy combining workfare and monitoring may be optimal when both income-generating ability and disutility of labor are
unknown.
“The voter who wasn’t there: Referenda, Representation and Abstention” (joint with Paulo Trigo Pereira)
(published in Social Choice and Welfare 22, 2004, 349-369)
We analyze single binary-choice referenda and identify the presence of the No-Show paradox in this simple setting, as a consequence of
turnout conditions that are included in actual voting rules. Since these conditions are meant to ensure a representative outcome, we try to
formalize this concern and reach our main result: no referendum rule can ensure representation if abstention is possible, unless specific
restrictive assumptions are made on the preference domain of abstainers. We then focus on the main referendum systems and show that such
restrictions do exist for most of those systems. The main purpose of our paper is, however, to provide a tool for referendum design.
Unawareness of the fact that defining a representative voting system necessarily entails restrictions on the preference domain of non-voters
may lead to the imposition of restrictions that do not satisfy any deliberate criteria and generate such problems as the No-Show paradox. We
therefore recommend instead that a conscious choice be made on how abstention is to be interpreted and that this choice be used as a tool to
derive the corresponding referendum rule.
“Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in a Mixed-Good Economy with Single-Peaked Preferences” (submitted)
We conduct an analysis of the implications of strategy-proofness and efficiency in a model of a mixed-good economy. We decompose the
mixed good into two components - a private good and a public good - and restrict the domain to separably single-peaked and lexicographic
preferences, where the private good is the primary concern of any agent. A rule simultaneously chooses a level of the public good that is also
the total amount available for the private good, and its distribution among the agents. We then study the implications of strategy-proofness
and efficiency in this model. Adding the requirements of continuity and symmetry, we achieve a fundamental result: that any rule satisfying
this set of properties must allocate its chosen public good level according to a uniform distribution. We then extract all the additional
implications of this set of properties, namely that the rule must have a closed range, and conclude that they are less demanding on how the
rule chooses the public good level, allowing for but not requiring the use of the uniform generalized median-voter rule. Both strategic and
normative concerns lead us however to a clear recommendation: the use of a uniform distribution, regardless of the associated choice for the
public good level.
“Efficiency and Equity in a Mixed-Good Economy with Single-Peaked Preferences” (submitted)
We introduce a model of a mixed-good economy where agents have single-peaked preferences. Decomposing the mixed good into two
components, a private good and a public good, we restrict the domain to separably single-peaked and lexicographic preferences, where the
private good is the primary concern of any agent. An allocation is simultaneously a public good level - which is also the total amount
available for the private good - and a distribution of this public good among the agents. We first describe the set of efficient allocations and
then introduce the normative distributional requirement of no-envy. We focus on the set of allocations that satisfy both efficiency and no-
envy, proving that, at any peak-only selection from that set, the public good level must be assigned to agents according to a uniform
distribution. We then study the consequences of imposing additional properties: although the population-monotonicity requirement is
incompatible with efficiency and symmetry for any peak-only rule, two other requirements allow us to obtain characterizations of two
efficient and envy-free rules that use a uniform distribution: one that satisfies resource-monotonicity and selects the associated minimum
efficient value for the public good level, and another that satisfies consistency and peak-only and that, whenever feasible, gives every agent
his private peak.
“The Tyranny of Solidarity”
(in progress)
We analyse the effect of imposing axioms based on notions of solidarity – namely resource-monotonicity, population-monotonicity and
welfare-domination under preference replacement – on a model where agents have extreme preferences and conclude that extremists benefit
the most from these notions of solidarity. We discuss the idea of solidarity and suggest alternative axioms based on that idea.
ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE
Teaching
Graduate
Spring 2004
Microeconomic Theory II, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Microeconomic Theory I, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Social Choice and Welfare, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Teaching Assistant, Microeconomic Theory II, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Reading Course, Social Choice and Welfare, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Teaching Fellow, Microeconomic Theory, Harvard University. Intermediate Microeconomics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Intermediate Microeconomics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Teaching Assistant, Public Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Teaching Assistant, Statistics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Teaching Assistant, Econometrics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
Referee
2000-present Referee
Econometrica, Mathematical Social Sciences, Portuguese Economic Journal.
Conferences
Mar 2004
Fuzzy Voters, Crisp Votes ; Universidad del País Vasco, Bilbao, Spain. Fuzzy Voters, Crisp Votes ; Université de Caen, Caen, France. Poverty-Alleviation Programs: Monitoring vs. Workfare; ASSET Annual Meeting 2003, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey (paper presented by co-author). Fuzzy Voters, Crisp Votes; Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice 3, Siena, Italy. Poverty-Alleviation Programs: Monitoring vs. Workfare; 2nd Meeting on Social Security and Complementary Pensions Systems 2003, ISEG, Lisboa, Portugal (paper presented by co-author). Fuzzy Voters, Crisp Votes; Quantitative Economics Doctorate Annual Meeting, Lisboa, Portugal. Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in a Mixed-Good Economy with Single-Peaked Preferences; The Sixth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Pasadena, CA, USA. Referenda, Quorum and the Abstention Paradox; Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society and Economic Science Association, San Diego, CA, USA (paper presented by co-author Paulo T. Pereira).
AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS
2002-2003
INOVA Research Fellowship, Portugal. (Foundation for Science and Technology) Fellowship, Portugal. Banco de Portugal Award (for highest grade point average in Economics). Democracia e Desenvolvimento - UNL Award (for highest grade point average). Companhia de Seguros «O Trabalho», Fisipe, Unisys, Associação Portuguesa de Seguradores (for highest grades in courses).
PERSONAL
Portuguese citizen. Born September 2, 1974.
Portuguese mother tongue. Fluent in English. Conversant in French and Spanish.

REFERENCES
Professor António Pinto Barbosa
Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa Littauer 316, Dept. of Economics, Harvard University Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisbon, Portugal School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study Department of Economics, Harkness Hall, Univ. of Rochester Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540; (609) 734-8309 Rochester, NY 14627, USA; (716) 275-2236

Source: http://ppamp.home.sapo.pt/resumenet.pdf

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