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One More Step and You’ll get Pseudo-Imperatives Université de Lyon, ENS-LSH and L2C 2 , CNRS Université de Nancy, France and ATILF, CNRS We consider pseudo-imperatives like Come near (and) I’ll show you, which havea conditional interpretation (‘if you come near, I’ll show you’). We show that theyhave basically the same semantics as Sufficiency Modal Constructions studied byvon Fintel and Iatridou (2007). We provide a detailed analysis of ‘sufficiency’ inLewis’s counterfactual framework, extending the analysis to pseudo-declaratives.
We discuss the possible origins of the construction and offer a characterisation ofthe syntax-semantics interface.
Pseudo-imperatives (P-imperatives) are structures of the form A-IMP B or A-IMP andB, where a conditional interpretation is possible, as in (1).
It has been proposed that the morphologically imperative constituent does not convey aseparate speech act of command, permission, etc., but combines with the second con-stituent to form a conditional unit, see Franke (2008) and Russel (2007) for recent ref-erences. This is specially useful to deal with contrasts noted by van der Auwera (1986)between A and B and A or B structures.
Unfortunately, it turns out that there are other, unexpected restrictions on the semantic relation between A and B in P-imperatives. Roughly speaking, A (and) Bsounds strange whenever the causal relation between A and B is perceived as ‘weak’, ina sense to be clarified in section 4.2. Yet, the relevant examples allow for conditionalparaphrases, a fact which is potentially problematic for the mentioned approaches. One Arndt Riester & Torgrim Solstad (eds.) Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 13, University of Stuttgart, 2009 could assume that P-imperatives are just conditional structures in disguise. One mustthen explain why the semantic relation between A and B does not coincide with thatobserved between the antecedent and consequent of conditional sentences. Alternatively,one could describe P-imperatives as ‘special’ conditionals, which, when compared tothe standard ones, obey additional constraints. In that case, the question arises whetherthere is a connection of some kind between the imperative morphology and these specificconstraints.
In this paper, we follow the second route and show that P-imperatives are special conditional structures that most probably inherit their semantic features from an inter-action between modal subordination and the basic semantics of imperative. In section2, we present the data we consider in the paper. In section 3, we focus on certain prob-lematic observations, which are not accounted for by current analyses. In section 4, wecharacterise the semantic constraint we propose in Lewis’s counterfactual framework,motivating the pseudo-imperative construction in section 4.3. Finally, in section 5, wediscuss briefly some aspects of the syntax-semantics interface.
In this section, we provide a short description of the relevant structures in English andin French. In addition to P-imperatives, one finds P-declaratives (2a-b), where A is adeclarative clause, P-optatives in French (2-c) and P-interrogatives (2d-e), where the marks rising intonation. We will be mostly concerned here with P-imperatives and b. Tu t’approches (et) je te montrec. Qu’ il vienne AB structures, where A is imperative and declarative, exist independently, without anyconditional interpretation. They realize two speech acts, a command (advice, invitation)in A, followed by the expression in B of a consequence of the eventuality that A’s speechact targets, through modal subordination (Roberts, 1989). For instance, (3) might beinterpreted as “I want you to come near. Then, I’ll show you”. It seems that the future ispreferred, but the present tense is not impossible.
Several factors interact in facilitating or preventing a conditional interpretation for P-X (where X may be imperative, declarative, etc.). First, prosodic cues play a role indiscourse attachment. Dargnat and Jayez (2008) show that, if a discourse segment A,occurring at the end of a sequence of segments Σ, is immediately followed by a segmentB, the absence (or shortness) of pause between A and B and the presence of a contin-uative contour on A, favours a direct attachment of B to A, rather than to a previous segment of Σ.1 The nature of the discourse relation is largely unspecified. For instance,(4a) features a justification and (4b) a temporal relation. If, other things being equal, aconditional interpretation is possible, the combination of a short/null pause and a contin-uative rise favours the integration of A and B into a unique conditional discourse relationholding between A and B.
Two remarks are necessary at this point. First, it is important to keep in mind thatprosody does not create the possible discourse relation(s). It only makes the attachmentof B to A most plausible and natural. The preferred attachment itself needs a discourserelation to gain substance. Therefore, the mentioned prosody-driven approach does notin itself account for P-X interpretations (where ‘X’ covers at least imperatives and declar-ative cases and possibly others). It would have this power only if one could show that, forinstance, imperatives and declaratives can convey some hypothetical meaning by them-selves. This is unlikely for imperatives2 and calls for further discussion in the case ofdeclaratives. Second, from the fact that A and B can be connected by a discourse rela-tion, it does not follow that the result forms a unique speech act. This might be the casefor P-imperatives, as proposed by Franke (2008), but it is more debatable for examplessuch as (4) or (5) (Dargnat, 2008, ex. 10), where the question about the title remainsseparate and the global speech act, if any, does not consist in questioning the conditionalrelation.
(5) Tu écris tes mémoires, tu leur donnes quel titre? ‘You write your memoirs, what title do you choose?’≈ If you write your memoirs, what title do you choose? However, in all cases, prosodic cues favour an ‘integrated’ interpretation. Either thereis a unique speech act or one of the acts is ‘focal’ or ‘foregrounded’, that is, it consti-tutes a potential answer to a question under discussion or introduces such a question.
For example, in French, (4b) can be an answer to the question A quelle heure est-il ar-rivé? (‘When did he come?’) and (5) introduces a question about the title. We groupthese two possibilities (speech act merging and foregrounding) under the generic labelof (discourse) integration.
A second type of factor is the semantic relation between A and B. In the most clear-cut cases, B expresses a consequence of A. Consequences can be divided into casesof triggering and generation. Intuitively, an eventuality e1 is a trigger of an eventualitye2 whenever e1 makes the occurrence of e2 more probable (or certain) according to gen-eral social, physical or logical laws. e1 generates e2 whenever the occurrence of e1physically coincides with the occurrence of e2. For instance, one can open a door (e2)by turning the key into the keyhole (e1). Pollack (1986, 1990) distinguishes betweengeneration and enablement: an action A1 enables A2 if A1 contributes to executing A2 1See (Mithun, 1988, p. 335) for a similar remark on the absence of an intonation break between con- 2We disagree with Corminbœuf (2008) on this point.
but, in addition to executing A1, it is necessary to do something else in order to achievethe result of A2. Note that (1) is a triggering case, not an enablement one. In additionto the consequence vs. enablement distinction, one must consider the type of the termsof the discourse relation, or in Sweetser’s (1990) terms the domains that are related. Forinstance, in (5), one may discern a relation between the fact of writing one’s memoirs(content domain) and the speaker’s question (speech act domain), which is prompted orat least made relevant by the writing. A content-based relation between writing one’smemoirs and choosing a title for them is also possible. As shown by Sweetser (1990)and Dancygier (1998), there is a rich array of possibilities in if -conditionals. P-X aremore restricted. For instance Austinian conditionals, a.k.a biscuit-conditionals, are in-felicitous with P-imperatives and P-optatives (6). The corresponding imperatives andoptatives are not impossible in P-X in general (7). These contrasts can be explainedby assuming that certain P-X require that there be a triggering or generation relation(causation type) between the content of A and that of B (domain type). Franke (2008)imposes an analogous constraint on P-imperatives. As shown by (7), P-imperatives andP-optatives do not require that the A part describe an action.
(6) a. ?? Be hungry (and) there are biscuits in the cupboard That he have-SUBJ hunger (and) there are biscuits (7) a. Be hungry (and) you’ll realize how hard it is to control your bodily reactions That he has-SUBJ hunger (and)il verra comme c’est dur de contrôler ses réactions corporelles‘he’ll see how hard it is to control one’s bodily reactions’ A third family of parameters is the choice of tense and mood. We won’t go into detail here, but we note that, in line with a similar observation by Culicover andJackendoff (1997), and is not compatible with a conditional interpretation when A is inthe conditional. So, and is not sufficient to determine a conditional interpretation.
(8) a. You’d come near, I’d show you (‘If you come near . . . ’) b. You’d come near and I’d show you (= ‘If you come near . . . ’) In this section, we make clear what the relevant data are and why they are problem-atic. In the literature on P-imperatives, one finds the view that they are not genuineimperatives but rather elements of a conditional construction (van der Auwera, 1986;Han, 1998; Takahashi, 2004; Russel, 2007; Franke, 2008). Whatever the details and thedifferences between them, these proposals have two benefits. First, they provide a sim-ple solution to van der Auwera’s asymmetry. van der Auwera (1986) observed that, infamilies of example like (9), whereas the first three forms are appropriate in oppositecontexts, like cold/hot weather, the last one is more difficult to interpret in both contexts.
If one assumes that the and sentences are conditional structures in disguise whereas thedisjunctive structures associate two speech acts through modal subordination (‘Do that, otherwise . . . ’), the first three sentences are predicted to be pragmatically appropriate.
More importantly, the last one is predictably odd in both contexts since the two speechact interpretation is implausible and the conditional one is not available. A similar dis-tribution exists for P-declaratives.
(9) a. Open the window and I’ll kill you [Context: it’s cold] b. Open the window or I’ll kill you [Context: it’s hot]c. Open the window and I’ll kiss you [Context: it’s hot]d. #Open the window or I’ll kiss you Second, if A is hypothetical, we have an explanation of why it externally behaves as anNPI-licenser environment (Culicover, 1972).
(10) a. Make any serious attempt to understand string theory and it’ll ruin your scientific b. Fais la moindre tentative sérieuse pour comprendre la théorie des cordes et ça In view of it ability to account for two major observations, the conditional approachseems to be on the right track. However, there are some unexpected contrasts, whichexhibit three features.
1. A conditional resultative interpretation is available. So, there is no question of a ‘hidden’ Austinian interpretation.
2. Only paratactic (= non-coordinated) P-declaratives are natural.
3. The contrast is unstable and seems to depend on the consequent.
Suppose for instance that the addressee has just bought a new computer and is verynervous about possible breakdowns. The speaker tries to make him relax by pointingout that he has signed in for a hot-line service. Although the four variants in (11) aimat conveying the very same conditional meaning (‘If you breakdown, you call the hot-line’), only the first is really natural.
(11) a. You break down, you call the hot-line b. #You break down and you call the hot-linec. #Break down, you call the hot-lined. #Break down and you call the hot-line One might hypothesise that the ‘you call the hot-line’ actually carries a directive speech act, a fact which, for some reason, would hinder the interpretation of the last threeexamples. But the contrast persists with P-optatives, which pattern like P-imperatives.
The contrast is also to be found with non-directive consequents. The directive interpre-tation may be absent from (13) if the speaker is taken to simply describe what is goingto happen.
(13) a. You have a headache, I give you some aspirin b. #Have a headache (and) I give you some aspirinc. #You have a headache and I give you some aspirin In the conditional paraphrases of (11) and (13), a result interpretation is available, sincecalling the hot-line (getting aspirin) results from breaking down (having a headache): ‘Ifyou break down, then you call the hot-line’ (description), ‘If you break down, then youmay/must call the hot-line’ (directive), ‘If you have a headache, then I give you someaspirin’.
The instability of the contrast is evidenced by (14). Suppose a context of car- pursuit, where a bunch of gangsters is running after the speaker and the driver, who isthe addressee. (14c) extends the paradigm in the direction of (13).
b. Break down (and) we are deadc. Have another fit (and) you are going to get an operation At this point, the problem we face is the following. To what extent can we account forthe observed contrasts without endangering the assimilation of P-imperatives and similarstructures to integrated semantic objects, in which only one speech act is executed? The term ‘automaticity’ is reminiscent of Bolinger’s (1977) remark that in A and B P-imperatives, given A, B is ‘automatically’ true. A consonant suggestion has been madeby von Fintel and Iatridou (2007) for Sufficiency Modal Constructions (SMC) of thegeneral form ‘If you want to get A you only have to do B’. In essence, von Fintel andIatridou propose that a SMC (i) presupposes that in every world where A obtains, theaddressee does something and (ii) asserts that in at least one world where B obtains, theaddresses does not do anything else than A. If we assume that P-imperatives correspondto SMC, we can account for (11c-d): there is no world reasonably similar to the actualworld in which it is sufficient to break down to call the hot-line, since the call itself isa mandatory action, which is not triggered/generated by the breakdown independentlyof the agent (the addressee). The proposal has to be slightly relaxed, to allow for thepossibility of (14)-type example. In the formulation given in (15), we leave open thepossibility that a does or undergoes e.
(15) Given an agent a and a couple of eventualities e, e , in which a participates, we say that e is an automatic consequence of e with respect to a, if e causes e and e isnot an action by a.
In view of examples like (16), we do not need to describe a presupposed component. Breacts to A’s P-imperative by denying that breaking down would lead automatically todeath. It is usually assumed that direct rejections (‘you are wrong’, ‘It’s false’, ‘You arelying’, etc.) cannot target the presupposed or implicated part of an assertion.3 3Actually, this is not that simple. In some cases, one can construct natural examples where a discourse participant attacks a presupposition or a conventional implicature. However, in (16) and analogous exam-ples, it seems difficult to find a presupposition or conventional implicature trigger and to articulate a maincontent fundamentally different from ‘B automatically follows from A’.
B – You’re wrong, we have guns, remember? This shows that the constraint for P-imperatives must put the automaticity condition atthe level of the main content. We treat P-optatives along the same lines since they patternwith P-imperatives. Only conjunctive P-declaratives must obey the same constraint.
A P-imperative or P-optative of the form A (and) B is appropriate only under aninterpretation where the eventuality described by B is an automatic consequence ofthe eventuality described by A with respect to the addressee. P-declaratives of theform A and B are subject to the same constraint.
Examples like (13) raise a problem, since having a headache might be a sufficient con-dition for getting aspirin if the aspirin is provided by someone else than the relevantagent (by default, the addressee in P-imperatives). Although they may sound odd outof the blue, they improve in appropriate contexts. For instance, (13) fits well in a situa-tion where the addressee is craving for aspirin. Generally speaking, communicating thefact that B is an automatic consequence of A makes better sense when automaticity isrelevant to the addressee’s goals and concerns, that is, whenever comparing A to othernon-automatic triggers of B or B to other non-automatic consequences of A can helpthe addressee to reach her goals or to update/revise her expectations, given her currentconcerns. When it is difficult to abduce plausible contexts for using constructions thatconvey automaticity, they will be felt as anomalous, even if is not difficult to abducecontexts that satisfy their basic semantic requirement, i.e. the automaticity condition.
This is just one more illustration of the fact that the Gedanke experiment of interpretingsentences in isolation combines understanding the meaning of the sentences and moti-vating their use. As an additional symptom of the difference, note that the followingvariant of (11) is perfect in a context where the addressee is seeking a reason for callingthe hot-line.
(18) a. You break down (and) you can call the hot-line b. Break down (and) you can call the hot-line So, pseudo-imperatives and coordinated P-declaratives demand that there be a causalrelation between the eventualities described by A and by B. It is apparent from the dis-cussion of causation type in section 2 that sufficient conditions correspond to triggeringor generation, but never to enablement. At this stage, we have to make precise at leastone notion of consequence, in order to provide a framework in which we can express thesufficiency requirement that characterises the pseudo-X we consider.
We resort to Lewis’s (1973a; 1973b; 2004) analysis of causation. Although some subtle aspects of causation might not be captured by Lewis’s approach (see the papersin Collins et al. (2004) for various illustrations), we consider that it covers all the maincases we need to take into account.
1. For a given similarity ordering ≺ between worlds, w, ≺|= A →B =df 2. B causally depends on A at w (w, ≺|= A One must keep in mind that the intuition for ‘A being a sufficient condition for B’ in acounterfactual analysis may convey a tension. On the one hand, to establish the truth ofA →B at w, only the minimal revisions of w with A are considered. This entails thatall that is necessary to derive B from A is already present in w or is a consequence ofadopting A in w and making as few changes as possible. In this respect, A is ‘sufficient’to ensure B. On the other hand, events posterior to A in w might play a role; so, in thatrespect, A is not really ‘sufficient’ to trigger B. Consider (14): if an unfortunate break-down occurs, the B event (the murder) cannot take place if the gangsters change theirplan for some reason and decide to abandon the pursuit. For B to take place, an actionby the gangsters is required, which means that the murder is not really ‘automatic’ in astrictly causal and deterministic sense. However, in the situation at hand, the murderousintentions of the gangsters are part of the initial conditions. Therefore, in order to obtainan acceptable definition for ‘B is an automatic consequence of A at w’, we need to makesure that (i) A causes B, that (ii) no eventuality of w posterior to or simultaneous with Aand which would not be caused only by eventualities preceding A is necessary for ob-taining B and that (iii) actions of the relevant agent (e.g. the addressee for P-imperatives)may be suppressed without changing the result B.
We construct our definition for automaticity in two major steps. First, we define a notion of sufficient condition; then, we define automaticity proper. We abbreviate(19.2) as A w,≺ B. Worlds are seen as sets of eventualities. The set of worlds, W , contains every consistent subset of eventualities. In particular, if w ∈ W , w ⊆ w and wis consistent, w ∈ W .
(20) For a set of eventualities E in w, CAUSEw,≺(E) = {e ∈ w : ∃e ∈ E(e CAU SEw,≺(E) stands for the set of causes of eventualities in E. We can now ‘slice up’ worlds into temporal regions with respect to A. X <w Y notes that the starting point of Yis posterior to that of X in w.
≪A ∪ {e ∈ w : CAU SEw,≺({e}) ⊆ w≪A} ∪ {e ∈ w : ∀e ((e ∈ CAUSEw,≺({e}) & e ≥w A) ⇒∃e (e ∈ CAUSEw,≺({e}) & e <w A))} w≪A is the set of eventualities that precede A. w (i) precede A or (ii) have at least one causal precursor that precedes A. The notion ofsufficient condition (22) corresponds to a causal dependence between a precursor A anda consequence B where the world ordering is sensitive only to those eventualities thatprecede A or have precursors that precede A.
In prose, A is a sufficient condition for B at w if, (i) when we compare only worldswhere no eventuality not preceding A or causally dependent only on eventualities notpreceding A takes place, at every closest world, if A then B, and (ii) ¬A →¬B holdsat w in the original model (W, ≺). In contrast with A →B, we do not require thatworlds be modified for ¬A →¬B. Consider the gangsters’ case. If the fugitives do notbreak down and the police has enough time to rescue them, we don’t want to suppressthe rescuing event because it occurs after the breakdown, since doing so might falsify¬breakdown →¬killing.
Under the simple deterministic view we have adopted, ‘A is a sufficient condition of B’ means that the causal link from A to B does not involve any eventuality that wouldbe independent of every event preceding A. In the gangsters’ case, given the initial setting(the physical circumstances and intentions of the agents) the killing is unavoidable oncethe breakdown has occurred. Thus, the breakdown is a sufficient condition of the killingsince all the eventualities that have a part in the result are triggered or generated byeventualities that precede the breakdown. With (11), the breakdown is also a sufficientcondition of the call if calling the hot-line is the consequence of a plan existing beforethe breakdown. In order to reflect von Fintel and Iatridou’s idea, we need an extraconstraint in the definition of sufficient condition. If a is the relevant agent, the generalidea is to ‘ignore’ the actions of a that do not precede A, even if they play a causal rolein bringing about B and are caused by eventualities that precede A. We define a newshrinking method, wa do not precede A. αx ranges over actions by x.
Finally, A entails B automatically if (i) B causally depends on A in a model where wekeep only the worlds where eventualities irrelevant to the causal connection between Aand B and actions not preceding A have been suppressed and (ii) ¬B causally dependson ¬A in the initial model.
B is an automatic consequence of A in w w.r.t. an agent a whenever:wa When applied to (11), (24) predicts that the action of calling the hot-line will be removedfrom any relevant world, which conflicts with the possibility of characterising the callas a consequence of the breakdown. The analysis offered here deliberately ignore theissue of causal preemption, that is, roughly speaking, the fact that several conflictingcauses may produce the same effect. It does not seem to be crucial for the type of simpleexamples we have commented. However it is an open problem whether preemption canbe accommodated in a counterfactual framework like Lewis’s (see Hall and Paul (2003);Spohn (2006)).
As noted in section 2, modal subordination plays a role in the conjunction of an imper-ative clause and a clause expressing one of its consequences (Jayez, 2002; Jayez and Rossari, 1999). Imperatives propose to or impose on the addressee a some course ofaction α. If the result of α depends on further actions of a, they should be mentionedas recommended or compulsory. It would be uncooperative to mention only α and tocount on some other action which does not necessarily follow from the context and isnot a default action by the addressee. So, in general, in a structure A-IMP B, where Bexpresses the result of A, this result is an automatic consequence. In such modally sub-ordinated structures, automaticity is a conversational implicature. It is not infrequent tosee pragmatically preferred interpretations of linguistic structures acquire a conventionalmeaning, although there is probably no agreement about what factors are (ir)relevant(frequency, saliency, etc.), as evidenced by the discussion in Ariel (2008, chap. 5). Weconjecture that automaticity has become the prominent conventional meaning of A-IMPB structures whenever prosody (short/null pause + continuative rise) favoured an in-tegrative interpretation, as explained in section 2. In addition to this combination of aconditional reading (integration) with automaticity (‘frozen pragmatics’4), P-imperativesexhibit a sort of bleaching on the imperative itself. The A part may use non-controlledpredicates, as in (25).
(25) a. Be a blonde and every man will start fantasising about you What is the role of and? Normally, and introduces the last term in an enumeration. So Aand B suggests that B is the last term in a sequence of eventualities. Consider paratactic(= non-coordinated) P-declaratives AB. The conditional interpretation corresponds to theview that the eventuality eA expressed by A leads to a point where eB is normally true orbound to be true. But other eventualities might play a role. The relation between eA andeB may be paraphrased by ‘given A, normally B’, which means that, in certain cases,for eB to obtain, eA should be supplemented by other eventualities, which are expectedto happen (‘normal’) in general or in the particular circumstances under consideration.
With coordinated P-declaratives, B is marked as final. Why would a speaker choose toemphasise that a result is final, rather than just a result? A plausible reason is that eAleads directly to the result (eB), without it being necessary to mention any interveningeventuality. So, the speaker is convinced that, given A, the whole process will run to itsterm, this belief being itself motivated by the fact eA leads automatically to eB withoutany agent intervention (blind causality) or with respect to some agent, whose actionis irrelevant to the result. We conjecture that the latter inferential motivation has beeninternalised as a grammatical construction, which would explain the difference betweenthe paratactic and and-coordinated forms for P-declaratives.
In this section, we discuss briefly the representation of P-structures in an extension ofthe HPSG framework (Pollard and Sag, 1994), designed to accommodate constructionsin the sense of Goldberg. Strictly compositional structures preserve the contribution oftheir constituents in isolation. In P-structures, A (and) B, A has not the meaning it has 4A term we borrow from Levinson (1987), see also Hyman (1984).
in isolation, e.g. imperatives are not semantically imperative. Moreover, the prosodicintegration of A and B cannot be attributed to A or B separately. The rising contouritself seems to be ambiguous between continuation and interrogation (Dargnat and Jayez,2008). This shows that P-structures should be analysed as constructions. It is well-known that Construction Grammars exploit feature structures of the type used in HPSG,in particular because they provide facilities for accessing different parts of informationsimultaneously (multidimensionality). The default mechanism of HPSG (Lascarides andCopestake, 1999) can also be imported. The following feature structure summarises themost important aspects of the representation for French. / notes a default value.
The decl-hd-su-cl type corresponds to declarative headed clauses with a subject and demands indicative or conditional mood. Imperative clauses demand imperativemood. The initial string X (et) Y is split into two constituents consA and consB. consAhosts preferentially a rising contour and is preferentially saturated (/{}). The pause ispreferentially short or null. Two discourse moves A and B with a common speakerare associated with A and B. attach type objects describe the attachment of a discoursemove to a subset (list) of discourse moves through a discourse relation (value of DR).
B must be attached to A through an automatic consequence relation.
placement of a value. The original illocutionary force of A is switched to a hypotheticalvalue. The whole construction inherits its illocutionary force (assertion) from B . Thenet result amounts to asserting the proposition (C) that an automatic consequence rela-tion holds between a hypothetical discourse move (A ) and an assertive discourse move(B ) attached to it.
This basic feature structure has to be supplemented with constraints that handle more specific details, such as the presence of et or mood/tense agreement. E.g., P-declaratives require the presence of et under the automatic consequence interpretation(1), when A is in the conditional, B also must be in the conditional (2), A may not be inthe plus-que-parfait (≈ pluperfect) (3), etc., see Dargnat (2008) for other examples.
1. CONSA : decl-hd-su-cl ⇒ STRING : X . et .Y2. CONSA : HEAD|MOOD : cond ⇒ CONSB : HEAD|MOOD : cond3. CONSA : TENSE : ¬plus-que-parfait In further work, we will apply the present approach to a larger spectrum of paratac-tic structures, involving for instance optative and interrogative clauses as well as NPs(see Culicover’s (1972) OM-sentences). Ideally, the relationship between coordina-tion and conditional interpretation would have to be studied in a broader typologicaland diachronic setting. In particular, the fact that and is semantically distinctive forP-declaratives should be compared with the idea that, typologically, conjunctive coordi-nation is less marked than, for instance, disjunctive coordination (Ohori, 2004). Whilethe contrast between and and or P-declaratives (one vs. two speech acts) goes in thesame direction, the role of and in P-declaratives is, in this respect, in need of furtherclarification.
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