Ikt.ei.hv.se

1
SINCE we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is
intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is
determined by the dictates of the right rule, let us discuss the nature of
these dictates. In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all
other matters, there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks,
and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard
which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between
excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule. But such a
statement, though true, is by no means clear; for not only here but in all
other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that
we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor too little,
but to an intermediate extent and as the right rule dictates; but if a man
had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser e.g. we should not
know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if some one were to say
'all those which the medical art prescribes, and which agree with the
practice of one who possesses the art'. Hence it is necessary with regard
to the states of the soul also not only that this true statement should be
made, but also that it should be determined what is the right rule and
what is the standard that fixes it.
We divided the virtues of the soul and a said that some are virtues ofcharacter and others of intellect. Now we have discussed in detail themoral virtues; with regard to the others let us express our view as follows,beginning with some remarks about the soul. We said before that thereare two parts of the soul-that which grasps a rule or rational principle, andthe irrational; let us now draw a similar distinction within the part whichgrasps a rational principle. And let it be assumed that there are two partswhich grasp a rational principle-one by which we contemplate the kind ofthings whose originative causes are invariable, and one by which wecontemplate variable things; for where objects differ in kind the part ofthe soul answering to each of the two is different in kind, since it is invirtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they havethe knowledge they have. Let one of these parts be called the scientificand the other the calculative; for to deliberate and to calculate are thesame thing, but no one deliberates about the invariable. Therefore thecalculative is one part of the faculty which grasps a rational principle. Wemust, then, learn what is the best state of each of these two parts; forthis is the virtue of each.
2
The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work. Now there are three
things in the soul which control action and truth-sensation, reason, desire.
Of these sensation originates no action; this is plain from the fact that thelower animals have sensation but no share in action.
What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance arein desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned withchoice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning mustbe true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the lattermust pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and oftruth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical norproductive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively(for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which ispractical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with rightdesire.
The origin of action-its efficient, not its final cause-is choice, and that ofchoice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choicecannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state;for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination ofintellect and character. Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but onlythe intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this rules theproductive intellect, as well, since every one who makes makes for anend, and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (butonly an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particular operation)-only that which is done is that; for good action is an end, and desire aimsat this. Hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire,and such an origin of action is a man. (It is to be noted that nothing thatis past is an object of choice, e.g. no one chooses to have sacked Troy; forno one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and capable ofbeing otherwise, while what is past is not capable of not having takenplace; hence Agathon is right in saying For this alone is lacking even to God, To make undone things that haveonce been done.) The work of both the intellectual parts, then, is truth. Therefore the statesthat are most strictly those in respect of which each of these parts willreach truth are the virtues of the two parts.
3
Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states once
more. Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul
possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art,
scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive
reason; we do not include judgement and opinion because in these we
may be mistaken.
Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not followmere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose that what weknow is not even capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside ourobservation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of scientificknowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are ofnecessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that areeternal are ungenerated and imperishable. Again, every science is thoughtto be capable of being taught, and its object of being learned. And allteaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in theAnalytics also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction andsometimes by syllogism. Now induction is the starting-point whichknowledge even of the universal presupposes, while syllogism proceedsfrom universals. There are therefore starting-points from which syllogismproceeds, which are not reached by syllogism; it is therefore by inductionthat they are acquired. Scientific knowledge is, then, a state of capacity todemonstrate, and has the other limiting characteristics which we specify inthe Analytics, for it is when a man believes in a certain way and thestarting-points are known to him that he has scientific knowledge, since ifthey are not better known to him than the conclusion, he will have hisknowledge only incidentally.
Let this, then, be taken as our account of scientific knowledge.
4
In the variable are included both things made and things done; making
and acting are different (for their nature we treat even the discussions
outside our school as reliable); so that the reasoned state of capacity to
act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence too
they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is
making acting. Now since architecture is an art and is essentially a
reasoned state of capacity to make, and there is neither any art that is not
such a state nor any such state that is not an art, art is identical with a
state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. All art is
concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how
something may come into being which is capable of either being or not
being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made; for art
is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, by
necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance with nature (since
these have their origin in themselves). Making and acting being different,
art must be a matter of making, not of acting. And in a sense chance and
art are concerned with the same objects; as Agathon says, 'art loves
chance and chance loves art'. Art, then, as has been is a state concerned
with making, involving a true course of reasoning, and lack of art on the
contrary is a state concerned with making, involving a false course of
reasoning; both are concerned with the variable.
5
Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who
are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be the mark of a
man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is goodand expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about whatsorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts ofthing conduce to the good life in general. This is shown by the fact that wecredit men with practical wisdom in some particular respect when theyhave calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of thosethat are not the object of any art. It follows that in the general sense alsothe man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom. Now no onedeliberates about things that are invariable, nor about things that it isimpossible for him to do. Therefore, since scientific knowledge involvesdemonstration, but there is no demonstration of things whose firstprinciples are variable (for all such things might actually be otherwise),and since it is impossible to deliberate about things that are of necessity,practical wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge nor art; not sciencebecause that which can be done is capable of being otherwise, not artbecause action and making are different kinds of thing. The remainingalternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to actwith regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while makinghas an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is itsend. It is for this reason that we think Pericles and men like him havepractical wisdom, viz. because they can see what is good for themselvesand what is good for men in general; we consider that those can do thiswho are good at managing households or states. (This is why we calltemperance (sophrosune) by this name; we imply that it preserves one'spractical wisdom (sozousa tan phronsin). Now what it preserves is ajudgement of the kind we have described. For it is not any and everyjudgement that pleasant and painful objects destroy and pervert, e.g. thejudgement that the triangle has or has not its angles equal to two rightangles, but only judgements about what is to be done. For the originatingcauses of the things that are done consist in the end at which they areaimed; but the man who has been ruined by pleasure or pain forthwithfails to see any such originating cause-to see that for the sake of this orbecause of this he ought to choose and do whatever he chooses and does;for vice is destructive of the originating cause of action.) Practical wisdom,then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard tohuman goods. But further, while there is such a thing as excellence in art,there is no such thing as excellence in practical wisdom; and in art he whoerrs willingly is preferable, but in practical wisdom, as in the virtues, he isthe reverse. Plainly, then, practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art.
There being two parts of the soul that can follow a course of reasoning, itmust be the virtue of one of the two, i.e. of that part which formsopinions; for opinion is about the variable and so is practical wisdom. Butyet it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by the fact that a state ofthat sort may forgotten but practical wisdom cannot.
6
Scientific knowledge is judgement about things that are universal and
necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration, and all scientific
knowledge, follow from first principles (for scientific knowledge involves
apprehension of a rational ground). This being so, the first principle from
which what is scientifically known follows cannot be an object of scientific
knowledge, of art, or of practical wisdom; for that which can be
scientifically known can be demonstrated, and art and practical wisdom
deal with things that are variable. Nor are these first principles the objects
of philosophic wisdom, for it is a mark of the philosopher to have
demonstration about some things. If, then, the states of mind by which
we have truth and are never deceived about things invariable or even
variable are scientific knowlededge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom,
and intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of the three (i.e. practical
wisdom, scientific knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the remaining
alternative is that it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles.
7
Wisdom (1) in the arts we ascribe to their most finished exponents, e.g. to
Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of portrait-statues, and
here we mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art; but (2) we
think that some people are wise in general, not in some particular field or
in any other limited respect, as Homer says in the Margites,
Him did the gods make neither a digger nor yet a ploughman Nor wise in
anything else. Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the
forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know
what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about
the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined
with scientific knowledge-scientific knowledge of the highest objects which
has received as it were its proper completion.
Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange to think that theart of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is notthe best thing in the world. Now if what is healthy or good is different formen and for fishes, but what is white or straight is always the same, anyone would say that what is wise is the same but what is practically wise isdifferent; for it is to that which observes well the various mattersconcerning itself that one ascribes practical wisdom, and it is to this thatone will entrust such matters. This is why we say that some even of thelower animals have practical wisdom, viz. those which are found to have apower of foresight with regard to their own life. It is evident also thatphilosophic wisdom and the art of politics cannot be the same; for if thestate of mind concerned with a man's own interests is to be calledphilosophic wisdom, there will be many philosophic wisdoms; there willnot be one concerned with the good of all animals (any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing things), but a different philosophicwisdom about the good of each species.
But if the argument be that man is the best of the animals, this makes nodifference; for there are other things much more divine in their natureeven than man, e.g., most conspicuously, the bodies of which the heavensare framed. From what has been said it is plain, then, that philosophicwisdom is scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive reason, of thethings that are highest by nature. This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales,and men like them have philosophic but not practical wisdom, when wesee them ignorant of what is to their own advantage, and why we say thatthey know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, butuseless; viz. because it is not human goods that they seek.
Practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with things human andthings about which it is possible to deliberate; for we say this is above allthe work of the man of practical wisdom, to deliberate well, but no onedeliberates about things invariable, nor about things which have not anend, and that a good that can be brought about by action. The man who iswithout qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable ofaiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of thingsattainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universalsonly-it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practiceis concerned with particulars. This is why some who do not know, andespecially those who have experience, are more practical than others whoknow; for if a man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome,but did not know which sorts of meat are light, he would not producehealth, but the man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likelyto produce health.
Now practical wisdom is concerned with action; therefore one should haveboth forms of it, or the latter in preference to the former. But of practicalas of philosophic wisdom there must be a controlling kind.
8
Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but
their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the city, the
practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom, while
that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is known by
the general name 'political wisdom'; this has to do with action and
deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the form of an
individual act. This is why the exponents of this art are alone said to 'take
part in politics'; for these alone 'do things' as manual labourers 'do
things'.
Practical wisdom also is identified especially with that form of it which isconcerned with a man himself-with the individual; and this is known bythe general name 'practical wisdom'; of the other kinds one is called household management, another legislation, the third politics, and of thelatter one part is called deliberative and the other judicial. Now knowingwhat is good for oneself will be one kind of knowledge, but it is verydifferent from the other kinds; and the man who knows and concernshimself with his own interests is thought to have practical wisdom, whilepoliticians are thought to be busybodies; hence the word of Euripides,But how could I be wise, who might at ease, Numbered among the army'smultitude, Have had an equal share? For those who aim too high and dotoo much. Those who think thus seek their own good, and consider thatone ought to do so. From this opinion, then, has come the view that suchmen have practical wisdom; yet perhaps one's own good cannot existwithout household management, nor without a form of government.
Further, how one should order one's own affairs is not clear and needsinquiry.
What has been said is confirmed by the fact that while young men becomegeometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it isthought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The causeis that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but withparticulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man hasno experience, for it is length of time that gives experience; indeed onemight ask this question too, why a boy may become a mathematician, butnot a philosopher or a physicist. It is because the objects of mathematicsexist by abstraction, while the first principles of these other subjects comefrom experience, and because young men have no conviction about thelatter but merely use the proper language, while the essence ofmathematical objects is plain enough to them? Further, error in deliberation may be either about the universal or aboutthe particular; we may fall to know either that all water that weighs heavyis bad, or that this particular water weighs heavy.
That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident; for it is, ashas been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thingto be done is of this nature. It is opposed, then, to intuitive reason; forintuitive reason is of the limiting premisses, for which no reason can begiven, while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular,which is the object not of scientific knowledge but of perception-not theperception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to thatby which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; forin that direction as well as in that of the major premiss there will be alimit. But this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though it isanother kind of perception than that of the qualities peculiar to eachsense.
9
There is a difference between inquiry and deliberation; for deliberation is
inquiry into a particular kind of thing. We must grasp the nature of
excellence in deliberation as well whether it is a form of scientific
knowledge, or opinion, or skill in conjecture, or some other kind of thing.
Scientific knowledge it is not; for men do not inquire about the things they
know about, but good deliberation is a kind of deliberation, and he who
deliberates inquires and calculates. Nor is it skill in conjecture; for this
both involves no reasoning and is something that is quick in its operation,
while men deliberate a long time, and they say that one should carry out
quickly the conclusions of one's deliberation, but should deliberate slowly.
Again, readiness of mind is different from excellence in deliberation; it is a
sort of skill in conjecture. Nor again is excellence in deliberation opinion of
any sort. But since the man who deliberates badly makes a mistake, while
he who deliberates well does so correctly, excellence in deliberation is
clearly a kind of correctness, but neither of knowledge nor of opinion; for
there is no such thing as correctness of knowledge (since there is no such
thing as error of knowledge), and correctness of opinion is truth; and at
the same time everything that is an object of opinion is already
determined. But again excellence in deliberation involves reasoning. The
remaining alternative, then, is that it is correctness of thinking; for this is
not yet assertion, since, while even opinion is not inquiry but has reached
the stage of assertion, the man who is deliberating, whether he does so
well or ill, is searching for something and calculating.
But excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of deliberation;
hence we must first inquire what deliberation is and what it is about. And,
there being more than one kind of correctness, plainly excellence in
deliberation is not any and every kind; for (1) the incontinent man and
the bad man, if he is clever, will reach as a result of his calculation what
he sets before himself, so that he will have deliberated correctly, but he
will have got for himself a great evil. Now to have deliberated well is
thought to be a good thing; for it is this kind of correctness of deliberation
that is excellence in deliberation, viz. that which tends to attain what is
good. But (2) it is possible to attain even good by a false syllogism, and to
attain what one ought to do but not by the right means, the middle term
being false; so that this too is not yet excellence in deliberation this state
in virtue of which one attains what one ought but not by the right means.
Again (3) it is possible to attain it by long deliberation while another man
attains it quickly. Therefore in the former case we have not yet got
excellence in deliberation, which is rightness with regard to the expedient-
rightness in respect both of the end, the manner, and the time. (4)
Further it is possible to have deliberated well either in the unqualified
sense or with reference to a particular end. Excellence in deliberation in
the unqualified sense, then, is that which succeeds with reference to what
is the end in the unqualified sense, and excellence in deliberation in a
particular sense is that which succeeds relatively to a particular end. If,then, it is characteristic of men of practical wisdom to have deliberatedwell, excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to whatconduces to the end of which practical wisdom is the true apprehension.
10
Understanding, also, and goodness of understanding, in virtue of which
men are said to be men of understanding or of good understanding, are
neither entirely the same as opinion or scientific knowledge (for at that
rate all men would have been men of understanding), nor are they one of
the particular sciences, such as medicine, the science of things connected
with health, or geometry, the science of spatial magnitudes. For
understanding is neither about things that are always and are
unchangeable, nor about any and every one of the things that come into
being, but about things which may become subjects of questioning and
deliberation. Hence it is about the same objects as practical wisdom; but
understanding and practical wisdom are not the same. For practical
wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to
be done; but understanding only judges. (Understanding is identical with
goodness of understanding, men of understanding with men of good
understanding.) Now understanding is neither the having nor the
acquiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding
when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so 'understanding'
is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the purpose of
judging of what some one else says about matters with which practical
wisdom is concerned-and of judging soundly; for 'well' and 'soundly' are
the same thing. And from this has come the use of the name
'understanding' in virtue of which men are said to be 'of good
understanding', viz. from the application of the word to the grasping of
scientific truth; for we often call such grasping understanding.
11
What is called judgement, in virtue of which men are said to 'be
sympathetic judges' and to 'have judgement', is the right discrimination of
the equitable. This is shown by the fact that we say the equitable man is
above all others a man of sympathetic judgement, and identify equity with
sympathetic judgement about certain facts. And sympathetic judgement is
judgement which discriminates what is equitable and does so correctly;
and correct judgement is that which judges what is true.
Now all the states we have considered converge, as might be expected, tothe same point; for when we speak of judgement and understanding andpractical wisdom and intuitive reason we credit the same people withpossessing judgement and having reached years of reason and withhaving practical wisdom and understanding. For all these faculties dealwith ultimates, i.e. with particulars; and being a man of understandingand of good or sympathetic judgement consists in being able judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned; for the equities arecommon to all good men in relation to other men. Now all things whichhave to be done are included among particulars or ultimates; for not onlymust the man of practical wisdom know particular facts, butunderstanding and judgement are also concerned with things to be done,and these are ultimates. And intuitive reason is concerned with theultimates in both directions; for both the first terms and the last areobjects of intuitive reason and not of argument, and the intuitive reasonwhich is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchangeable andfirst terms, while the intuitive reason involved in practical reasoningsgrasps the last and variable fact, i.e. the minor premiss. For these variablefacts are the starting-points for the apprehension of the end, since theuniversals are reached from the particulars; of these therefore we musthave perception, and this perception is intuitive reason.
This is why these states are thought to be natural endowments-why, whileno one is thought to be a philosopher by nature, people are thought tohave by nature judgement, understanding, and intuitive reason. This isshown by the fact that we think our powers correspond to our time of life,and that a particular age brings with it intuitive reason and judgement;this implies that nature is the cause. (Hence intuitive reason is bothbeginning and end; for demonstrations are from these and about these.)Therefore we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinionsof experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not lessthan to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eyethey see aright.
We have stated, then, what practical and philosophic wisdom are, andwith what each of them is concerned, and we have said that each is thevirtue of a different part of the soul.
12
Difficulties might be raised as to the utility of these qualities of mind. For
(1) philosophic wisdom will contemplate none of the things that will make
a man happy (for it is not concerned with any coming into being), and
though practical wisdom has this merit, for what purpose do we need it?
Practical wisdom is the quality of mind concerned with things just and
noble and good for man, but these are the things which it is the mark of a
good man to do, and we are none the more able to act for knowing them
if the virtues are states of character, just as we are none the better able
to act for knowing the things that are healthy and sound, in the sense not
of producing but of issuing from the state of health; for we are none the
more able to act for having the art of medicine or of gymnastics. But (2) if
we are to say that a man should have practical wisdom not for the sake of
knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, practical wisdom
will be of no use to those who are good; again it is of no use to those who
have not virtue; for it will make no difference whether they have practical
wisdom themselves or obey others who have it, and it would be enoughfor us to do what we do in the case of health; though we wish to becomehealthy, yet we do not learn the art of medicine. (3) Besides this, it wouldbe thought strange if practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophicwisdom, is to be put in authority over it, as seems to be implied by thefact that the art which produces anything rules and issues commandsabout that thing.
These, then, are the questions we must discuss; so far we have onlystated the difficulties.
(1) Now first let us say that in themselves these states must be worthy ofchoice because they are the virtues of the two parts of the soulrespectively, even if neither of them produce anything.
(2) Secondly, they do produce something, not as the art of medicineproduces health, however, but as health produces health; so doesphilosophic wisdom produce happiness; for, being a part of virtue entire,by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a man happy.
(3) Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practicalwisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the rightmark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means. (Of the fourthpart of the soul-the nutritive-there is no such virtue; for there is nothingwhich it is in its power to do or not to do.) (4) With regard to our being none the more able to do because of ourpractical wisdom what is noble and just, let us begin a little further back,starting with the following principle. As we say that some people who dojust acts are not necessarily just, i.e. those who do the acts ordained bythe laws either unwillingly or owing to ignorance or for some other reasonand not for the sake of the acts themselves (though, to be sure, they dowhat they should and all the things that the good man ought), so is it, itseems, that in order to be good one must be in a certain state when onedoes the several acts, i.e. one must do them as a result of choice and forthe sake of the acts themselves. Now virtue makes the choice right, butthe question of the things which should naturally be done to carry out ourchoice belongs not to virtue but to another faculty. We must devote ourattention to these matters and give a clearer statement about them.
There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this is such as to be ableto do the things that tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves,and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but ifthe mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness; hence we call evenmen of practical wisdom clever or smart. Practical wisdom is not thefaculty, but it does not exist without this faculty. And this eye of the soulacquires its formed state not without the aid of virtue, as has been saidand is plain; for the syllogisms which deal with acts to be done are thingswhich involve a starting-point, viz. 'since the end, i.e. what is best, is ofsuch and such a nature', whatever it may be (let it for the sake of argument be what we please); and this is not evident except to the goodman; for wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived about thestarting-points of action. Therefore it is evident that it is impossible to bepractically wise without being good.
13
We must therefore consider virtue also once more; for virtue too is
similarly related; as practical wisdom is to cleverness-not the same, but
like it-so is natural virtue to virtue in the strict sense. For all men think
that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by
nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for
selfcontrol or brave or have the other moral qualities; but yet we seek
something else as that which is good in the strict sense-we seek for the
presence of such qualities in another way. For both children and brutes
have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without reason these
are evidently hurtful. Only we seem to see this much, that, while one may
be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without sight may
stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a man once acquires
reason, that makes a difference in action; and his state, while still like
what it was, will then be virtue in the strict sense. Therefore, as in the
part of us which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness and
practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural
virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves
practical wisdom. This is why some say that all the virtues are forms of
practical wisdom, and why Socrates in one respect was on the right track
while in another he went astray; in thinking that all the virtues were forms
of practical wisdom he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical
wisdom he was right. This is confirmed by the fact that even now all men,
when they define virtue, after naming the state of character and its
objects add 'that (state) which is in accordance with the right rule'; now
the right rule is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. All
men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind of state is virtue, viz.
that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. But we must go a little
further. For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but
the state that implies the presence of the right rule, that is virtue; and
practical wisdom is a right rule about such matters. Socrates, then,
thought the virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they
were, all of them, forms of scientific knowledge), while we think they
involve a rational principle.
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be
good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise
without moral virtue. But in this way we may also refute the dialectical
argument whereby it might be contended that the virtues exist in
separation from each other; the same man, it might be said, is not best
equipped by nature for all the virtues, so that he will have already
acquired one when he has not yet acquired another. This is possible in
respect of the natural virtues, but not in respect of those in respect ofwhich a man is called without qualification good; for with the presence ofthe one quality, practical wisdom, will be given all the virtues. And it isplain that, even if it were of no practical value, we should have needed itbecause it is the virtue of the part of us in question; plain too that thechoice will not be right without practical wisdom any more than withoutvirtue; for the one deter, mines the end and the other makes us do thethings that lead to the end.
But again it is not supreme over philosophic wisdom, i.e. over the superiorpart of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health; for it doesnot use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders, then, forits sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain its supremacy would be likesaying that the art of politics rules the gods because it issues orders aboutall the affairs of the state.

Source: http://ikt.ei.hv.se/personal/impf/per/NichVI.pdf